101ST CONGRESS
2d Session

SENATE

REPORT
101-243

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES IN THE ANDEAN REGION OF SOUTH AMERICA

REPORT

MADE BY THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 6 (legislative day, JANUARY 23), 1990.—Ordered to be printed

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Mr. GLENN, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 26, 27, and 29, 1989, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the status of U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean Region of South America. The purpose of these hearings was to provide an in-depth picture of past, present, and future U.S. and related source country efforts aimed at reducing the supply of cocaine available for the U.S. market. To accomplish this purpose, the Subcommittee invited source country officials and ex-

perts to testify, in addition to representatives of U.S. government agencies involved in the anti-drug effort.

On September 26th, testimony was received from: Senator Arlen Specter; William J. Bennett, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy; David Westrate, Assistant Administrator for Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration; and Richard J. "Mike" Long, Peruvian Program Coordinator, Drug Enforcement Administration.

On September 27th, the Subcommittee heard from: Victor Mosquera Chaux, Ambassador of Colombia; Cesar Atala Nazal, Ambassador of Peru; Carlos Delius, Ambassador of Bolivia; Enrique Parejo Gonzalez, Ambassador of Colombia to Czechoslovakia and former Minister of Justice; Oswaldo Antezana Vaca Diez, Undersecretary for Alternative Development, Bolivian Ministry of Agriculture; and Jose Gonzales, Peruvian political analyst/journalist.

On September 29th, testimony was received from: Gustavo Gorriti, Peruvian journalist/political analyst; Dr. Bruce M. Bagley, Associate Professor and Director of the Andean Studies Project, University of Miami; Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, Department of State; Michael Skol, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of American Republic Affairs, Department of State; Steven M. Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support; and General Robert T. Herres, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The hearings' timeliness and importance were underscored by Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Sam Nunn, who noted that:

> United States interests in the Andean Region are broad and substantial, encompassing political and security concerns, trade and economic issues, and of course narcotics. * * * Despite that fact, over the last ten years amazingly little attention has been paid to these countries. In 1987, for example, U.S. anti-narcotics assistance for the whole Region amounted to less than 1 percent of the amount the U.S. spends on anti-drug activities.

Similarly, Senator William V. Roth, Jr., the Subcommittee's Ranking Minority Member pointed out that:

> The recent events in Colombia have graphically illustrated the power of drug cartels and their ability to ravage a nation. Other countries in the Andean Region, such as Bolivia and Peru, also produce and supply cocaine to the world. We cannot allow the terror and violence that has infected Colombia to spread across the borders to its neighbors.

The hearings culminated a year-long Subcommittee investigation conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution 381, adopted February 25, 1988 and Senate Resolution 66, adopted February 28, 1989. These Resolutions authorize the Subcommittee to examine, among other things, " * * * aspects of crime and lawlessness within the United States which have an impact upon or affect the national health, welfare, and safety;" and the efficiency and economy of government operations concerning "the effectiveness of present national

security methods, staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting complexity of national security problems." The relationship between the Nation's drug problem and national security was effectively established by a National Security Decision Directive, which was signed by the President on April 8, 1986.

In addition to the customary review of relevant source materials and interviews with responsible government officials and other knowledgeable individuals, the Subcommittee hearings and investigation were based on two field trips—one at the end of February, 1989, to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Panama; the other in August, 1989, to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. In the course of these trips, Subcommittee staff examined, firsthand, U.S. and source country anti-drug operations and held extensive meetings with concerned U.S. and source country officials regarding the latter. A Staff Statement summarizing the results of these trips was inserted into the Record at the opening of the hearings on September 29th.

The following summary report is based on information gathered by the Subcommittee in connection with its overall investigative effort, the Staff Statement, and the hearings transcripts and exhibits.

II. SOURCE COUNTRIES ARE ALSO VICTIMS

As noted by virtually all of the source country witnesses and reported in the Subcommittee Staff Statement, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia are subject to drug-related violence, corruption, health, and other problems that to varying degrees are undermining their overall economic, political, and social well-being. Narco-traffickers in Colombia, through bribery, intimidation, and murder, have forced the country's justice system into a state of virtual paralysis. According to Colombia's Ambassador to the U.S., Victor Mosquera Chaux, over 200 judges and other judicial personnel and 2,700 members of the military and police have been killed; including, a Justice Minister, Supreme Court Justices, and a former chief of the anti-narcotics police. With the trafficker-instigated assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan, the situation in Colombia reached an even more ominous level. While this prompted decisive action on the part of Colombia's President, Virgilio Barco, the judicial branch problem persists, as reflected in the resignation of the Justice Minister, Monica DeGreiff. As Colombia's present Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and former Justice Minister, Enrique Perejo Gonzalez, testified:

> Our country is now at a crossroads. The time has come to decide if we will win or lose the war against drugs. The smallest hesitation could lead to the latter, bringing as a consequence, the destruction of democracy.

Parejo also called narco-trafficking "the most serious threat ever unleashed against humanity."

In Peru, the affects of narco-trafficking are similar. For example, according to the testimony of Peruvian journalists Jose Gonzales and Gustavo Gorriti, a growing insurgency—mounted by the extremist and violence-prone Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) movement—has become intertwined with coca cultivation and traffick-

ing activities. Because of this two-pronged threat, the Peruvian government, already under severe pressure owing to an economic crisis of major proportions, has to expend additional scarce resources in fighting both; thereby tending to make the overall situation in the country worse.

For Bolivia, as its Ambassador to the U.S., Carlos Delius, testified "we, too, are victims of this deadly plague." The Ambassador went on to point out that foremost among the problems generated by narco-trafficking is corruption. He testified that government leaders, up to and including a former President, were actively involved with the narco-traffickers in the early 1980s. While these leaders fell from power (the former President and Interior Minister were recently tried and convicted in absentia), the power of the traffickers continued to pose a sufficient threat to the successor government, so that the U.S. was asked in mid-1986 to send in military help (a controversial undertaking that came to be known as Operation Blast Furnace).

Significantly, officials in all three source countries stated that in recent years they have observed an increase in drug use among their youth—primarily in the form of a less refined and therefore, more dangerous, version of crack cocaine called basuco. As this has happened, attitudes in the source countries towards the drug problems have changed. Ambassador Delius confirmed this in his testimony:

> Our business and political leaders for years always considered narco-trafficking as a problem of the wealthy consuming countries. Drug use was thought of as a by product of the deterioration of western society, certainly not a scourge on our own house. Now, we are all victims. Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and the other producing countries will never mature and develop if the drug culture captures our youth.

III. SOURCE COUNTRIES ARE LIMITED IN WHAT THEY CAN DO

Nevertheless, the democratically elected governments of Peru and Bolivia are and will continue to be preoccupied with problems that pose a more immediate threat to their countries than drugs. In Peru, the economy is in a shambles, suffering from, among other things, runaway inflation that recently caused its currency to decrease in value by 25 percent within a single month. Peru's gross domestic product shrank 28 percent in the first quarter of 1989 and it is saddled with a crushing debt burden—some $16 billion at the end of 1988.

Relatedly, Peru's armed forces are faced with the growing threat posed by the Sendero Luminoso insurgents. The Subcommittee Staff reported that both Peruvian and in-country U.S. officials stated that the armed forces have been seriously affected by major budget cuts inspired by the economic crisis. This situation is so severe that Army elements fighting the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas in the main coca growing area (the Upper Huallaga Valley or UHV) typically have to live off the land and the not necessarily friendly local population. In addition, many Peruvian soldiers have retired or gone AWOL and many officers are holding second jobs.

As the staff also reported, Peruvian officers undergoing a training course recently had to take up a collection among themselves to buy light bulbs for their classroom.

One high level Peruvian official summarized the overall situation his country faces by stating that Peru can live with the drug problem for fifty years, but only two to five years with the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. At the time of the hearing, Peruvian journalist Jose Gonzales testified that the Sendero Luminoso controlled about one-third of the country. Gonzales concluded that in Peru:

> It is clear at this point that it is possible to fight only against the guerrillas and not the traffickers, but it is impossible to fight only the traffickers and not the guerrillas. For the Army to effectively fight the guerrillas, it is important to have the support of the local population and to have the support means that the present law against coca growing must be ignored.

Bolivia and Peru are to a considerable extent dependent on "the cocaine economy" in their countries, which further complicates their ability to mount and sustain their anti-drug efforts. According to the testimony of Gustavo Gorriti, anywhere from 1 to 1.5 million people—most of whom are in Bolivia and Peru—are directly involved in coca cultivation and processing, and many more are dependent on cocaine production and trafficking for a substantial part of their legal or semi-legal income. Gorriti estimates, for example, that "in Bolivia cocaine exports are probably greater than all legal exports put together," while for Peru he estimates the value of its cocaine exports at around $1.5 billion (total legal exports are valued at about $3 billion).

Colombia's situation differs in some key respects from those affecting Peru and Bolivia. For example, it has a sizeable, healthy legal economy and as, Ambassador Parejo testified, the narco-traffickers' money "neither creates wealth nor generates employment, other than to the small number of people who work directly in their illicit activities." Nevertheless, Colombia faces other problems that impact on its ability to focus resources on anti-drug efforts. For instance, for many years and continuing up to the present time, Colombia's armed forces have been preoccupied with the need to fight largescale leftist insurgencies within their country's borders.

Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned economic considerations, all three countries share other items that impinge on their anti-narcotics capability, including:

Constitutional and/or other legal limits on involving the armed forces in law enforcement matters, including drug issues. Even when the circumstances seem to call for a greater military role—such as in the case of Peru, where the traffickers are allied with the Sendero Luminoso insurgents—there is considerable hesitation about increased armed forces participation. For example, Professor Bruce Bagley cited "the dangers that militarization implies for the delicate balance between civilian and military authority in Colombia, and by extension, other Andean and Latin American countries." Moreover, as noted in the Staff Statement, in all three coun-

tries there is considerable rivalry and friction among the various militaries and anti-narcotics police forces.

The literal geographic vastness, remoteness, and cross-border nature of the areas in which cultivation, processing, and trafficking take place. In Bolivia, for example, the area in which most of the cocaine processing is done (the Beni) is the size of Texas and large parts of it become virtually inaccessable during a protracted rainy season. In Peru, the one major road in and out of the UHV is controlled by the Sendero Luminoso, and thus virtually everything needed to support anti-drug operations in that region must be brought in by air. Similarly, in terms of sustained anti-drug operations, the remote, jungle areas along the Peruvian and Colombian border, in which many cocaine processing facilities are located, are essentially beyond the reach of either the police or armed forces.

IV. U.S. EFFORTS HAVE BEEN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE

U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean region have been largely ineffective in reducing the overall amount of coca cultivation and in disrupting the processing of and trafficking in cocaine, so as to reduce the supply available for the U.S. market. Three broad categories of reasons explain this situation: the overall approach has been flawed; interagency coordination and cooperation has been inadequate; and, resources have been insufficient.

The approach has been flawed

In general, recent U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean countries have been essentially bilateral and have concentrated on coca eradication and interdiction. The focus on eradication reflects the State Department's long-standing belief in and commitment to reducing the supply of cocaine by eliminating the basic raw material used to make it. While there is certainly nothing inherently wrong with this concept—it enjoyed some success in the 1970s in connection with marijuana and poppy cultivation in Mexico and Turkey, respectively—State's coca eradication programs have been only marginally successful and have not been able to keep pace with the increase in new cultivation. In the area of interdiction, DEA's approach—as embodied in its two-and-a-half year long effort conducted under the codename "Operation Snowcap"—has been similarly flawed and results have been correspondingly disappointing.

Eradication

A number of factors help to explain the lack of success in the area of eradiction, including:

The allocation of personnel and resources primarily to crop destruction. This has left insufficient means to provide affected growers and peasants, who have voluntarily agreed to or been forced from illegal coca cultivation or low-level coca processing, with an immediate way to replace the income lost and to assist them in finding other ways to earn their livelihood. During the hearings several source country witnesses emphasized that comparatively little has been done in the area of alternative development, i.e., establishing substitute crop and other economic assistance programs. As Ambassador Delius put it:

> Countries such as Bolivia must also receive substantial development assistance. it is foolish to expect any government to win this war if its only mission is to rip up [coca] bushes. We are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On the one hand the U.S. conditions its aid on meeting eradication targets. On the other, coca farmers expect and demand more than mere promises.

The approach has failed to reflect the fact that as eradication and interdiction efforts succeed, hundreds of thousands of subsistence-level peasants will have to find another way of earning their living; and, that if there is nothing in place to assist them in this regard, they are likely to become prime candidates for existing or incipient insurgent groups. In fact, in Peru this has already begun to happen, i.e., eradication efforts have driven the coca growers into the arms of the Sendero Luminoso insurgents, who have adeptly exploited the fact that this U.S.-inspired program threatens the peasants' existence in a time of extreme economic hardship. In his testimony, Jose Gonzalez referred to this point, stating that "since 1988, Sendero has tried to link eradication with land tenancy * * * preach[ing] that 'the gringos want to take away our lands.' Of course, this is not true, but nevertheless the peasants believe it."

Reliance on manual means (gasoline-operated "weed whackers" and/or machetes) to cut down the coca plants. This technique is comparatively slow, labor intensive and, in the case of Peru, extremely dangerous. Indeed, according to U.S. narcotics assistance unit officials in Peru, since the program began several years ago in the UHV, scores of the eradication workers have been killed or injured. By February, 1989 the situation in the UHV had become so hazardous that all anti-drug operations were suspended for a period that lasted about seven months. There is, moreover, some question as to how effective the manual eradication techniques are, since in some instances the plants grow back within a year in a seemingly even healthier state.

Some U.S. anti-narcotics officials continue to pressure their Peruvian and Bolivian counterparts to authorize the use of the highly controversial and unpopular technique of aerial herbicide spraying to destroy coca plants. As noted by Ambassador Delius, in his country this practice is expressly forbidden by its new anti-drug law. The Ambassador went on to say:

> * * * with all due respect, Bolivia will not be bludgeoned into taking actions that would inflict unknown and unquantified risks on our citizens and likewise create serious political consequences for the Government. * * * Even if spraying is found to be safe and effective, we cannot risk the danger of alienating 300,000 peasant farmers who, with little provocation could become a potential guerrilla force.

Peru's Ambassador to the U.S., Cesar Atala, likewise expressed strong reservations about the use of chemical eradication methods, noting that "it is undoubtedly clear" that they will create another set of potentially devastating problems. In addition, the Sendero

Luminoso have successfully exploited the mere mention of this idea for anti-American and anti-government propaganda purposes.

Questions also have arisen regarding the safety and possible environmental effect of the herbicide—"Spike"—that the State Department is recommending. These questions are being addressed in a U.S.-sponsored test spraying program in Peru, although the results at this time remain inconclusive. However, neither the U.S., Peru, nor anyone else seems to be weighing the potential environmental impact of Spike against the possible ecological harm being caused by coca cultivation and processing. Indeed, as described in the Staff Statement, the Peruvian scientists at the herbicide test site said that no one has done a comprehensive, ongoing scientific study of the environmental effects of coca cultivation and processing.

According to U.S. diplomatic personnel, source country officials, and hearing witnesses, sanctions-based requirements have often been counter-productive as far as anti-drug efforts are concerned. For example, as discussed in the Staff Statement and in testimony by Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Chief of Staff, John P. Walters, debt-reduction requirements mandated by the Brooke/Alexander Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act have made it extremely difficult for military assistance to be provided to Peru's armed forces at the very time when the narco-insurgent threat has been steadily growing.

In Bolivia, the second poorest country in Latin America and a nation earnestly trying to boost its fragile economy out of one of the worst inflationary periods ever experienced, Foreign Assistance Act-mandated certification requirements have been used to hold up or eliminate significant sums of badly needed aid on more than one occasion. In his testimony, Ambassador Delius referred to the effects of such actions:

> The U.S. carrot of development assistance and economic support also carries with it a stick—the threat to impose sanctions and cut off the very assistance that a poor country must have in order to compete against the drug cartels.

Interdiction

DEA's approach has also been problematic and, therefore, disappointing in terms of results. As discussed in the Staff Statement, for example, in Bolivia and Peru much of the initial focus was on the bottom rung of the cocaine production process, i.e., destroying so-called "pozo" (maceration) pits, where coca leaves are stomped and transformed chemically into coca paste. The inherent problem with this is that it most affects large numbers of peasants, who are trying to eke out a subsistence level existence, while least affecting less numerous but more powerful and important traffickers. In Bolivia, for example, the average yearly per capita income is below $600, while the average yearly per capita income for a farmer is $360. Even for a coca farmer, the yearly per capita income is only $750.

In Bolivia, the net result of this approach was to minimally disrupt trafficking activities, while creating previously non-existent

resentment and hostility among the peasants. In effect, where no insurgent threat was previously present, these types of interdiction efforts were helping to create some of the conditions that could one day lead to such activity. Indeed, Ambassador Delius warned that "we are writing a prescription for disaster and potentially creating thousands of new recruits for terrorist organizations if we continue to pressure the growers but ignore others higher up in the drug chain."

In addition, DEA's decision to rely on 90-day Temporary Duty (TDY) personnel to carry out its interdiction program has caused significant problems in operational continuity and in the continuity of relationships with their source country counterparts. Internal DEA documents, such as the so-called "White Report," indicate that DEA's initial approach was also marred by inadequate language training, poor personnel selection criteria, and an overall disregard for personal and mission-related security procedures.

The deficiencies in DEA's performance outlined above have led some—including the present U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia—to conclude that it is not best-suited to carry out interdiction operations in the Andean countries. As noted in the Staff Statement, advocates of this view argue that the kind of anti-drug operations being conducted in Peru and Bolivia—e.g., air-mobile search and destroy missions against clandestine labs and airfields—are "para-military" in nature and hence fall more appropriately in the domain of the military.

While conceding that mistakes have been made, DEA and other experts reply that many of the problems DEA has experienced in connection with its interdiction programs have been or are in the process of being corrected. For instance, in response to a question from Chairman Nunn, DEA's Assistant Administrator for Operations, David Westrate, explained that as a result of a joint DEA/DoD effort a new, two-month specialized training course has been developed for DEA Operation Snowcap personnel.

Similarly, they reject the idea that military forces are better suited to the task at hand. As the Operation Snowcap Peruvian Program Coordinator, "Mike" Long, emphatically testified, our anti-drug efforts in the Andean Region are "a law enforcement endeavor * * * not a military endeavor." As a former Marine Corps captain who served in Vietnam and as the person in charge of DEA's Snowcap efforts in Peru for the past two years, he added that it is easier to train a DEA agent to take on the task of a soldier than the other way around. In effect, he and others view "green suiters," who are trained to shoot and kill an enemy, as being ill-equipped to perform the requisite seizure and arrest functions that anti-drug operations entail.

Bilateral versus multilateral efforts

The U.S. approach has generally failed to involve regional and international organizations to the degree that it could. Virtually every witness at the hearings explicitly or tacitly alluded to this failure. Indicative of the views of the source country witnesses was the following observation by Ambassador Parejo:

> Since [the narcotics trade] is a matter that concerns all humanity, it is up to the international community, not the individual countries to face this terrible evil. Colombia is only the circumstantial center of the war being fought. The cooperation of all the countries of the world is urgently required in order to finally defeat narco-trafficking.

The Ambassador went on to urge "each country to put into effect the recently adopted Vienna Convention against narcotics," which in his view "constitutes the rationale needed by the international community to effectively combat" the drug problem.

Professor Bagley also emphasized this point. While indicating that U.S. leadership and resources are "certainly important," he stated that "primarily bilateral initiatives and programs are inherently inadequate for several basic reasons," including:

> * * * they run the risk of fueling nationalist resentments and raising fears of U.S. political domination * * * they are circumscribed by the limited availability of U.S. aid funds * * * [and] they preempt the participation of other nations in the Hemisphere and Europe that are also affected by the drug trade and that have resources and expertise to contribute.

Interagency cooperation and coordination have been inadequate

U.S. anti-narcotics efforts in the Andean Region have been substantially undermined by a failure on the part of concerned agencies—e.g., the Defense (DoD) and State Departments, DEA, and those responsible for intelligence collection and analysis—to adequately cooperate with one another and coordinate their respective drug-related activities. For the most part, the reasons for this can be traced to legitimate differences in their respective institutional missions, attitudes, and operational approaches, which seem to prompt almost inherent conflicts between and among them.

State and DEA, for example, have completely different statutory missions. In accordance with the Single Convention of 1961, DEA is responsible for all drug-related matters in foreign countries and, yet, at the same time the State Department has overall responsibility for any U.S. government-related activity overseas. In terms of attitudes and operational approaches the differences are equally problematic, i.e., DEA personnel are trained in law enforcement methods, such as investigations, search seizure, and/or arrest, while State Department personnel are first and foremost schooled in the ways of diplomacy.

Similar difficulties exist regarding State and/or DEA relationships with DoD. For example, in constrast to DEA's law enforcement approach, DoD personnel are trained to find the enemy and destroy his facilities and equipment. Moreover, according to DoD, State, and DEA officials in Washington and in the field, DoD is reluctant to be involved in Andean Region anti-drug activities in any way that might lead eventually to a combat role. In addition, as cited in the Staff Statement, DoD personnel at the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Panama told Subcommittee investigators that even in the one area where DoD has played a signifiant role, i.e., providing logistical support and training to both U.S. and

source country anti-drug programs and personnel, it has often done so reluctantly and at a level below its real capability. These SOUTHCOM and other DoD officials with whom Subcommittee staff met maintain that Economy Act provisions restrict DoD's ability to provide any such assistance without reimbursement from State and DEA. In the hearings, however, Assistant DEA Administrator Westrate testified that Operation Snowcap has been getting "tremendous support * * * not only from [the] Special Forces but other elements of the U.S. military establishment, as well."

The following examples of the kinds of cooperation and coordination problems experienced by the concerned U.S. agencies are taken from the Subcommittee Staff Statement:

At the Chimore forward base for anti-drug operations in Bolivia, DoD personnel turned down a DEA request to share some communications equipment, which would have filled a gap in the latter's system, thereby significantly increasing the anti-drug forces' overall operational capability.

There have been instances of a lack of cooperation between providers and users of drug-related intelligence at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota. As a result, U.S. personnel and host country operatives working for these agencies with drug-related intelligence functions will sometimes duplicate each others' efforts and, in so doing, increase the risk involved, including unwittingly placing each others' lives in danger.

Reflecting the long-standing State Department-DEA turf battles and rivalry, a high-level State Department field coordinator scathingly denounced, to Subcommittee staff, DEA's ability to work with local anti-narcotics police and Peruvian naval forces in riverine operations and later added that he wants DEA entirely out of anti-drug operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

Finally, and particularly indicative of the problems with coordination, both ONDCP Director Bennett and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Melvyn Levitsky, testified at the hearings that they had neither been notified by nor consulted with the responsible State Department or Office of the U.S. Trade Representative officials on how the impending expiration of the International Coffee Agreement might adversely affect anti-drug efforts in Colombia. According to Ambassador Mosquera, his government and the people of Colombia can not comprehend how, on the one hand, the U.S. can be as responsive as it has been in the present crackdown against the traffickers—for example, by providing some $65 million in emergency military assistance—while, on the other hand, allowing the International Coffee Agreement to expire, which could cost Colombia as much as $500 million annually in lost revenue.

Resources have been inadequate

In view of the progressive worsening of the Nation's drug crisis over the past several years, and the fact that virtually all of the cocaine coming into the U.S. is derived from coca grown in and/or processed through Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the resources allocated to source country, anti-drug efforts have been woefully inadequate. Data supporting this conclusion are striking:

Between 1985 and 1988, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia received from the U.S. a combined total of $124.6 million in narcotics-related assistance (i.e., international narcotics control funds and narcotics-related development projects). The net total of all U.S. bilateral aid for these three countries during the same period was $638.1 million. Narcotics-related assistance, therefore, amounted to about 20% of overall U.S. bilateral assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

For purposes of comparison, during the same 1985–1988 timeframe, U.S. bilateral assistance for El Salvador alone amounted to $1.6 billion. Two other Central American countries received more or nearly as much U.S. bilateral assistance as Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia combined over this four-year period—Honduras ($951.2 million) and Guatemala ($569.3 million).

For 1988, out of $10.6 billion in total bilateral U.S. foreign aid, $173.5 million (about 2 percent) went to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

For 1988, out of $4.1 billion in total Federal anti-drug spending, $44 million (about 1 percent) went for anti-narcotics assistance for Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

One representative example, which is cited in the Staff Statement, of how this lack of adequate resources affected our anti-narcotics efforts took place in Peru during the late '88/early '89 timeframe in connection with our eradication and interdiction efforts in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Reflecting a variety of resource-based constraints—i.e., insufficient numbers of operationally ready helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, inadequate forward base facilities, and logistics deficits—available helicopters had to split their time between eradication/interdiction missions and transporting personnel and supplies needed to support them. In combination with weather and security problems, these resource-based constraints resulted in DEA's conducting operations on just 24 days out of one 120-day period. On this point, Assistant Administrator Westrate testified that they only have enough helicopters now because they are not being used, as before, to deploy coca eradication workers. He added that while the present fleet of helicopters is now "almost exclusively available for interdiction raids * * * if the eradication workers got back in business we again would have a scheduling problem".

Moreover, in Peru less than a dozen helicopters have been available over the past year or so to cover a rugged, mountainous jungle area the size of New Jersey. In Bolivia, a similar number of helicopters have been assigned to cover the Texas-sized Beni region (where many cocaine processing facilities are located) and the 5,000 square mile Chapare coca growing area. Not all of these helicopters are up-and-running at any given time, so there are effectively even fewer of them to handle the already overwhelming territorial prerequisites.

V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ARE MORE PROMISING

The combination of recent developments—the Colombian government's crackdown against the traffickers, modifications and improvements in U.S. programs in Bolivia and Peru, and the Admin-

istration's National Drug Control Strategy Andean Initiative—suggest that there may be grounds for some optimism regarding the future effects of our anti-drug efforts in the coca-growing and cocaine-producing countries of South America.

Actions by the Colombian Government

In response to the assassination of the popular presidential candidate, Senator Luis Carlos Galan, Colombian President Virgilio Barco instituted a number of emergency decrees. These decrees prompted dramatic changes in his country's anti-drug efforts that were not deemed possible up to the very time of this tragic event. One of the decrees, as noted by Ambassador Mosquera, provides for the summary extradition from Colombia to the U.S. of traffickers under indictment in the U.S. Extradition is the action the traffickers fear most and have fought hardest against. Indeed, as a result of trafficker-instigated intimidation, such extraditions had been suspended since 1987, owing to a decision by Colombia's Supreme Court that had nullified the existing procedure. The Government crackdown, according to Ambassador Mosquera, has also included the seizure and confiscation of trafficker assets, such as "scores of homes, apartments, ranches and luxury villas [and] thousands of aircraft and automobiles." Estimates of the value of these assets range into the tens of millions of dollars.

While it is too early to draw any firm conclusions on the effect of the crackdown, it is clear that it has disrupted the traffickers operations and lifestyles for the time being. Gustavo Gorriti and DEA Assistant Administrator Westrate both testified that it has also had some positive spillover affect in the other source countries, e.g., in Peru smuggling flights to and from Colombia have been curtailed, coca paste and cocaine base are being stockpiled, and, reflecting these factors, the price of coca leaf has fallen precipitously. To the extent that the crackdown can be effectively sustained, the impact on the traffickers and their smuggling activities is likely to continue to grow.

Modifications and improvements in U.S. efforts

In Bolivia and Peru, the State Department and DEA have shifted their operational focus away from the bottom rung of the coca growing and cocaine production process. As INM Assistant Secretary Levitsky testified:

> Our focus has changed from the past. We are going after high priority targets rather than concentrating on manual eradication and destruction of paste pits.

For example, DEA is now concentrating its activities on the operations, facilities (clandestine airstrips and labs), and assets (planes, helicopters, etc.) of specific trafficker organizations and individuals. These are highly significant changes, since they effectively remove joint U.S./source country anti-drug forces from those areas of coca cultivation and the cocaine production cycle, wherein the largest number of subsistence-level peasants are involved, and instead pits them against the more powerful and important trafficking elements.

In addition, as discussed in the hearings and the Staff Statement, there appears to be a growing consensus among U.S. officials in the field that for meaningful progress to be achieved in our Andean Region anti-narcotics efforts, what is needed is a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustained program comprised of inter-dependent interdiction, eradication, and economic development components. Assistant Administrator Westrate, among other Administration witnesses, underscored this evolving consensus when he indicated in his prepared remarks that DEA's interdiction efforts are being done "in conjunction with eradication and economic development programs."

Similarly, as noted in the Staff Statement, in contrast to what Subcommittee investigators heard during their initial trip to the Andean Region in February, 1989—i.e., the U.S. approach was focused almost entirely on eradication and interdiction—during their second trip in August, 1989, an additional element—economic development—had been added. For example, in two separate meetings with Subcommittee staff during the latter visit, the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia made strikingly similar statements to the effect that the drug problem in that country is "fundamentally, but not completely, a development issue."

Equally important, this acknowledgement of the need to focus more on economic development, has been coupled with the added realization that such efforts will require resources far beyond those allocated in recent years. The U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia has developed a detailed plan calling for a five-year, $500 million package of development assistance—half for the coca-growing Chapare Region and the remainder for the rest of the country. In addition, as indicated in the testimony of ONDCP Director Bennett, the Administration's current plan for Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia calls for a proposed $2 billion in combined economic and military assistance to be spent over the next five years.

Lastly, among the major modifications and improvements in the U.S. approach, proposed plans calling for a direct operational role on the part of U.S. military forces have been shelved. For example, the plan proposed by the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, which called for replacing DEA Operation Snowcap personnel with U.S. Special Forces elements, is no longer being pursued. In the testimony of ONDCP Director Bennett, as well as that presented by the Defense and State Department witnesses, there was complete agreement that the anti-drug role U.S. armed forces should play is one of continuing to provide needed training and logistical support. These same witnesses also acknowledged that the Governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia have strongly emphasized that they do not want U.S. armed forces to participate directly in anti-drug operations within their countries.

The Andean Region Initiative

The initial response to the Andean Region Plan—part of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, which was released on September 5, 1989—has been largely positive. In their hearing testimony, for instance, the source country Ambassadors all indicated that their Governments see the Initiative as a good step in the right direction because it calls for more resources for Andean

Region anti-drug efforts and acknowledges the need for increased emphasis on economic development. Other source country and U.S. witnesses expressed similar views.

The Initiative is also important because it re-emphasizes the U.S. commitment on behalf of source country anti-drug efforts. There have been substantial concerns among both source country and our officials in the field that the U.S. may not be willing to continue these efforts owing to the growing risk to our personnel operating there. Acknowledging these concerns in his testimony, ONDCP Director Bennett strongly affirmed the U.S. commitment to the Andean countries and at the same time reminded the American people that, while risks are indeed present, they must be considered as an unavoidable part of any genuine attempt to effectively fight the drug war.

However, some concerns have also arisen regarding the Initiative. Some source country witnesses, for example, wondered whether the increased funds called for in the Initiative would be enough and whether sufficient amounts of the proposed increases would go for drug-related economic development purposes. They expressed considerable concern regarding the fact that for fiscal year 1990, the Initiative contains no funds for economic assistance, i.e., all of the additional amounts beyond the original fiscal year 1990 request are for military, law enforcement, and intelligence purposes. Assistant Secretary Levitsky testified that this allocation of resources for fiscal year 1990 "is based on the assumption that first of all you have to help the governments concerned gain control and restore civil authority" in the areas, such as the Upper Huallaga Valley, where drug activity is taking place. He noted that in the remaining years of the Initiative, 1991–1994, additional increments of performance-based economic assistance will be provided. These projected sums, he added, had not yet been worked out in precise detail.

Still other concerns have been prompted by preliminary indications that in implementing the Initiative U.S. officials intend, at least at the outset, to focus on source country militaries. That focus ignores the fact that Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia all have constitutional and/or other legal prohibitions against involving their armed forces in law enforcements issues, such as the anti-drug effort.

Multilateral efforts

At the outset of the hearings, Senator Arlen Specter testified in support of a resolution, which was included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100–690), expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should initiate negotiations on the idea of establishing an "international drug force to pursue and apprehend major international drug traffickers." Senator Specter pointed out that, as a result of the recent events in Colombia, this idea is now "on center stage and ought to be acted upon." He mentioned that it is also being pursued by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley. Chairman Nunn, while noting that he has long supported the idea of such an anti-drug force, pointed out that it is just one component of the Manley proposal, which also calls for increased international anti-drug efforts regarding intelligence sharing, training, treatment, and income substitution programs.

Other hearing witnesses expressed skepticism about the feasibility of the proposal. ONDCP Director Bennett said that while they intend to "take a serious look at it, he has already had informal discussions with U.S. military people, who have told him that "this is a tough thing to pull off * * *." Later in the hearings, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Steven M. Duncan, responded to a question from Senator Lieberman on this subject, stating that "it is under discussion," but DoD has not taken a definitive position one way or the other. He added that while "it sounds like the kernel of a good idea," there are also problems associated with it, "not the least of which * * * is how the idea would be received by [the] Latin American nations, themselves." The Andean country Ambassadors also expressed strong reservations about the multilateral force. Ambassador Mosquera, for example, said he believed it "could not be very effective." Ambassador Atala agreed and Ambassador Delius expressed the concern that it "could be used as an excuse to promote violence, which at this time does not exist."

Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by the witnesses, what is important about the discussion regarding the multilateral drug force is that it is part of a broader current effort aimed at "internationalizing" the approach to the drug problem. As ONDCP Director Bennett put it, in discussing the anti-drug force, "I very much like the idea of us trying to broaden the base of support to involve more and more countries." Consideration of the anti-drug force, particularly as part of comprehensive plans, such as the one proposed by Prime Minister Manley, helps focus attention on the area of international efforts which, up to this point, has been inadequately utilized by those countries concerned about or directly involved in the war against drugs.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

These hearings and the supporting investigation that led to them demonstrate that source country anti-drug efforts are both desirable and necessary. In addition to their obvious potential affect on reducing the supply of cocaine available for the U.S. market, they are a vital component of the need to stabilize and preserve fragile democratic governments in this key part of the world.

While source country anti-drug efforts in recent years have been largely ineffective, the combination of the changes that have been and/or are taking place in the U.S. approach, the recent crackdown against the traffickers in Colombia, and the President's Andean Region Initiative are promising developments that may produce greater results than have been achieved previously. This is not to say, however, that these prospective results will solve our drug consumption pattern. Indeed, given the severity and complexity of the drug-related and other major economic and political problems faced by Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, we need to be realistic in our expectations regarding the source country anti-drug efforts currently being planned or implemented.

In sum, source country anti-drug efforts—especially as part of the overall approach embodied in the recent National Drug Control Strategy—are important; but, however successful they may be,

they alone can not help us to win the war on drugs. Regarding the latter, the bottom line remains that the supply side of the drug problem for which the source countries are responsible is driven by the demand in the United States and, in this sense, the solution continues to rest in the hands of the millions of Americans who choose to use drugs.

With these concluding thoughts in mind, the Subcommittee makes the following recommendations:

(1) The United States Government should do everything possible to help the Colombian Government sustain its current crackdown against the traffickers. Particular emphasis should be focused on providing expedited assistance to protect Colombian judges and magistrates, and to otherwise shore up the Colombian judicial system.

(2) Concrete efforts should be undertaken immediately to assure that U.S. anti-drug and economic policies regarding the Andean Region are fully coordinated and are not operating at cross purposes. If, for example, Colombia stands to lose tens of millions of dollars in revenue owing to the expiration of the International Coffee Agreement, United States anti-drug policy should be adjusted accordingly.

(3) The U.S. approach to source country anti-narcotics efforts should be comprehensive and sustained, focusing simultaneously on eradication, interdiction, and drug-related economic development. Since economic development has been relatively neglected until recently, increased emphasis should be placed on efforts along these lines.

(4) Given the likely long-term costs of the comprehensive, sustained approach above, the Administration and Congress should consider the idea of adding funds beyond the $2.2 billion called for in the President's Andean Region Initiative.

(5) DEA should continue to be responsible for conducting U.S. interdiction operations, to the extent they are found to be feasible, in the source countries. DOD Special Forces personnel should not be used in such operations, except in supporting roles, i.e., as medics and communications technicians, under the control of DEA unless more extensive use is requested by the host countries.

(6) DEA should extend the three-month-long period of the present Operation Snowcap TDY tour. At a minimum, such assignments should be for six months. Along these lines, further consideration should be given to the idea of establishing a specialized "foreign service corps" within DEA.

(7) DOD's basic role in source country anti-drug efforts should continue to be focused on training and logistical support. The scope of such activity, however, should be expanded, especially in terms of facilitating the transportation and delivery of supplies and equipment needed by DEA and State. For example, ways should expeditiously be found to use National Guard flights in this regard and to provide additional helicopters for use in source country anti-drug operations.

(8) DOD should bear the cost of this proposed expansion in its role in accordance with the funding mechanisms provided for in the Fiscal Year 1990–91 Defense Authorization Act.

(9) Consideration should be given to revising, temporarily waiving, or suspending some restrictive or sanctions-based policies—for example, as has been done recently regarding the Brooke-Alexander and Bumpers Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act—when such policies have had the unintended effect of interfering with the U.S. Government's ability to assist particular source and/or transit countries in their anti-drug efforts.

(10) In order to help overcome the persistent problems in interagency cooperation—as exemplified in the case of the International Coffee Agreement's expiration and its potential affect on Colombian anti-drug efforts—the position of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy should be given Cabinet-level status.

(11) In view of the global nature of the drug problem, the attendant costs involved, and the U.S. inability to promise more support than it already has, increased emphasis has to be placed on "internationalizing" the approach to Andean Region anti-narcotic activities. These efforts, which could conceivably lead to the development of a multilateral, "Mini-Marshall Plan," should involve assistance from Europe and other countries and regions where drugs pose a major threat.

(12) Andean Region anti-narcotics efforts must be flexible enough to take into account the differences in the drug-related problems faced by Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

(13) The United States and/or appropriate international organizations should undertake an ongoing scientific study of the ecological effects of coca cultivation and processing in Latin America. Such efforts should focus on Bolivia and Peru, but should also take into account the wider possible damage occurring in other nearby Amazon Basin countries. In addition, scientific studies of the environmental effects of herbicides proposed for aerial coca eradication should be done before any largescale U.S.-sponsored spraying program is permitted.

The following Senators, who were members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at the time of the hearings, have approved this report.

Sam Nunn
John Glenn
Carl Levin
James Sasser
David Pryor
Herbert Kohl
Joseph I. Lieberman

William V. Roth, Jr.
Ted Stevens
William S. Cohen
Warren Rudman [1]

Other Senators, who are members of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, approving this report are:

Jeff Bingaman
John Heinz

The Members of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, except those who were members of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at the time of the hearings, did not participate in the hearings on which the above report is based. Accordingly, they have taken no part in the preparation and submission of the

[1] See p. 20 for additional views of Senator Rudman.

report, except to authorize its filing as a report made by the Subcommittee.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WARREN B. RUDMAN

The Chairman and ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, Senator Nunn and Senator Roth, are to be commended for their efforts to examine the effectiveness of United States operations to combat drug trafficking in the Andean region of South America. Attacking the drug problem at the source is an important component of the President's overall drug strategy and is one which has received increased attention since enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It is, however, important that Congress and the Administration proceed cautiously in the arena of international drug control since our actions have implications beyond the drug arena. This Subcommittee has undertaken the examination of coordination and efficiency of these operations and has raised a number of important issues to consider in formulating future international drug control policy.

The Subcommittee recommendation that the position of the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy be given Cabinet-level status is problematic. Section 1003 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, in fact, accords Cabinet status to the National Drug Control Policy Director by virtue of including the position in Level One of the Executive Pay Schedule. That is the rank of the Secretaries of the Cabinet Departments. It is a position held by only twenty officials in the federal government, and it can only be granted through a legislative enactment. Officially, the recommendation was acted on fifteen months ago.

Moreover, President Bush has by word and deed indicated his support for that law. The President has publicly affirmed that Director Bennett has Cabinet-rank, thus giving him the standing within the Administration necessary to deal with the major Department heads on an equal basis. The President has also demonstrated that Director Bennett is his chief developer of, and spokesman on, drug policy. Director Bennett has assured this Subcommittee that he has access to all necessary information and has received cooperation from all of the Executive Departments involved in the drug war, another clear sign of presidential support for his role. As Peter Bensinger, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration from 1976–1981 pointed out in a Washington Post column of January 15, 1989, Director Bennett's appointment was based on his experience and reputation; ultimately his success will depend on the President's confidence in his judgment and ability. The record indicates that Bill Bennett has the President's confidence and support. Thus, taken literally, the Subcommittee's recommendation has already been acted on and has no meaning.

If, instead, the recommendation is intended to imply that President Bush should by an Act of Congress be required or pressured to permit Director Bennett to sit through every meeting of the Cabi-

net, I strongly disagree. The decisions as to with whom a President meets with, at which times, and under what circumstances, are uniquely presidential. Under our three branch system of government with a separation of powers, it is no more appropriate for Congress to try to legislate on that subject than it would be for the President to try to force the Senate or the House to organize themselves in a certain manner. Congress has never attempted to dictate who attends Cabinet meetings, and it should not start down that road now.

In addition, although it is not relevant to my position, I cannot help but point out that there is nothing in the Subcommittee report which supports congressional action relating to attendance at Cabinet meetings, nor did this issue come up at the Subcommittee's hearings. If there is a case to be made for legislative action, nobody has made it. Hopefully, nobody will try and this question will fade off into the sunset.

Finally, several other recommendations in the report require further study. I have signed the report because it does a good job of identifying many of the problems which have surrounded our drug interdiction efforts in South America, but I do not necessarily endorse each recommendation.

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